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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Timothy Isiah Jones was convicted of one count of trafficking in
heroin and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.
Mr. Jones asserts the district court erred by admitting evidence at trial that he was on
probation and searched pursuant to a Fourth Amendment waiver. Mr. Jones also asserts that the
district court erred in admitting a knife officers found in the front pocket of his pants when they
frisked him. He received a unified sentence of thirty years, with fifteen years fixed. Mr. Jones
contends that his sentence represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive
given any view of the facts.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address some of the State's erroneous conclusions and
far- fetched legal arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Jones's Appellant's Brie£

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by admitting I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that Mr. Jones was on
probation?

II.

Did the district court err by admitting the knife into evidence at trial?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence? 1

1

Mr. Jones' arguments regarding the excessive sentence were fully addressed in his initial
Appellant's Brief
2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Testimony And Evidence That Mr. Jones Was On
Probation
In its Respondent's Brief, the State agrees with Mr. Jones's contention that the evidence
that Mr. Jones was on probation was offered and admitted solely to explain why the police
searched Mr. Jones's crotch first, "the evidence [that Mr. Jones was on probation] was explicitly
offered and admitted for a single permissible purpose: to explain the propriety of an otherwise
inexplicable police search [down the front of Mr. Jones's pants]." (Respondent's Brief, p.12.)
However, the State fails to explain how this was relevant to its proof of the elements of
trafficking. (See Respondent's Brief, generally.)
The State claims that "[w]hile the district court did mention the 'context of the search,' it
did so not to conduct a res gestae analysis, but to point out the basis for admission under Rule
404(b)." (Respondent's Brief, pp.20-21.) This is correct as the district court found evidence or
testimony that Mr. Jones was on probation2 was (arguably) I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, but admitted
it to show the "context of the search." (2/20/18 Tr., p.23, Ls.3-6.) Whether the district court
admitted the evidence after finding it was relevant or whether it admitted it because it believed
the evidence met an I.R.E. 404(b) propensity exception, the district court abused its discretion by
misapplying the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it.
The district court's analysis that evidence to show the "context of the search" is an
exception to I.R.E. 404(b)'s prohibition on propensity evidence was erroneous. (See 2/20/18
Tr., p.22, L.19 -p.23, L.6.) While the exceptions listed under I.R.E. 404(b) are not exhaustive,

3

the "context of the search" cannot be categorized under any of the listed exceptions.

As

Mr. Jones asserted in his Appellant's Brief, the "context of the search" is simply another way of
saying "res gestae," a theory of admissibility which was rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Kralovec.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15; see also State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 873 (2019)

(holding the district court's use of the phrase "intertwined with other issues" suggests that it used
an improper res gestae analysis in admitting the lack of a driver's license).
After the State concedes that the probation status was only admissible to show the
reasons for the officers' actions (and not to information had no tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence any more probable than it would be without the evidence), it
argues that it was admissible under State v. Yakovac; however, the State's claim ignores
controlling precedent. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-14.) The State claims that "[t]he Yakovac
decision controls the outcome here." (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) The State fails to address
Mr. Jones arguments regarding the applicability of State v. Kralovec to the facts of his case,
other than to say that Mr. Jones' argument "misinterprets" the 2017 decision and that Mr. Jones'
reading of Kralovec would require an "unworkable evidentiary standard," in that he was asking
for the prohibition of all otherwise admissible res gestae evidence. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9,
12-23.) Such an assertion is patently absurd and is based upon an intentional misreading of
Mr. Jones's argument. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.9-15.)
Although the State claims the evidence that Mr. Jones was on probation and had executed
a Fourth Amendment waiver was otherwise admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the
State's argument as to which rule the evidence is admissible under is nonexistent.

2

(See

The district court analyzed the admissibility of both law enforcement testimony as well as
Mr. Jones's statements regarding his probation on the videotaped interview. (2/20/18 Tr., p.13,
L.2 - p.22, L.20.)
4

Respondent's Brief, pp.8-27.) As Mr. Jones asserted in his Appellant's Brief, the evidence was
improperly admitted. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-16.)
Although the district court ultimately admitted the evidence under I.R.E. 404(b ), the court
preliminarily found it was admissible under 401 because it "does have a tendency to make any
fact more likely or not." (2/20/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-7.) However, using the evidence of Mr. Jones'
status as a probationer to explain the officer's actions is unnecessary and irrelevant. Relevant
evidence is evidence having the tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
I.R.E. 401.

To determine whether a fact is material, the reviewing court examines its

relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 443. Here,
whatever motivation the officer had for beginning a search of Mr. Jones by reaching his hand
down the front of Mr. Jones' pants was of no consequence to whether Mr. Jones possessed a
certain quantity of heroin. The district court erred in its recitation of the relevance standard and
it misapplied the I.R.E. 401 analysis.
The Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Miller further illustrates this point. There the
district court allowed an officer to testify that he had parked away from a house in which an
alleged assault had taken place because he feared for his own safety. Miller, 157 Idaho 838, 84142 (Ct. App. 2014). The Court of Appeals held this evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible:
[T]he officer described events that took place after Miller's alleged criminal
conduct had ceased. Information about where the investigating officers parked
and why they parked there was entirely irrelevant. Admission of that testimony
allowed the jury to hear that the officer feared for his safety because a gun had
been used in the house, thereby conveying hearsay information received from the
911 call. Although courts are sometimes permitted to admit evidence of events
that are not, strictly speaking, part of the charged criminal episode in order to give
the jury a "complete story" if exclusion of the evidence could result in jury
confusion or misleading inferences, e.g., State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 721
(Ct. App. 2010); State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 18 (Ct. App. 1994), that

5

principle has no application here. The officer's testimony about his concern for
officer safety was not necessary to give the jury a complete story, and its absence
would not have left any confusing gap in the narrative or resulted in misleading
inferences. Accordingly, the testimony was irrelevant.

Miller, 157 Idaho at 842 (first emphasis in original) (internal citations modified). Here too, the
fact that Mr. Jones was on probation and so the officers felt it was acceptable to search his
crotchal region first, was not necessary to give the jury the complete story because that
information had no tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence any more
probable than it would be without the evidence. It is incongruous to allow this evidence because
of the prosecutor's concerns that the jury would acquit the defendant because the police conduct
during the stop was invasive. (2/20/18 Tr., p.16, L.2 - p.18, L.23.) "[A]nd its absence would not
have left any confusing gap in the narrative or resulted in misleading inferences." Miller, 157
Idaho at 842. The evidence was thus inadmissible.
The State claims that the district court correctly concluded that evidence of Mr. Jones'
probationary status "was admissible per the Idaho Rules of Evidence." (Respondent's Brief,
p.21.) However, the State neglects to mention which rule the evidence was, or should have been,
admitted under.

(See Respondent's Brief, pp.8-27.)

This is because the evidence is

inadmissible, except as res gestae: "other acts that occur during the commission of or in close
temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described to complete the story of the
crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings."

Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573.
The State asserts that the facts of Mr. Jones' case are indistinguishable from Yakovac.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-12.) However, the Court's decision in Yakovac was in 2008, and the

6

Court decided Kralovec in 2017. 3 Under Kralovec, a different result is reached-an explanation
of the reasons for the officer's actions constitutes res gestae evidence, which is only admissible if
it qualifies as an exception under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573-74.
The State also claims that it was Mr. Jones's burden to argue to the district court that it
was erroneously admitting the probation testimony by performing an improper res gestae
analysis. (Respondent's Brief, p.17.) The State misunderstands its evidentiary burdens. The
State, as the proponent of the evidence, must assert that otherwise inadmissible propensity
evidence is admissible pursuant to an exception as set forth in I.R.E. 404(b). The State failed to
establish the admissibility of the prohibited propensity evidence.

In trying to establish the

inapplicability of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 2017 in Kralovec, the State relies
entirely upon Yakovac, the Court's 2008 decision. (Respondent's Brief, pp.20-21.) The State's
arguments are unpersuasive as they seek disavowal of controlling Idaho Supreme Court
precedent. The State concludes that "warrant testimony is admissible to explain police actions"
under Yakovac, and similarly in Mr. Jones's case, the probation testimony was admissible under
the rules of evidence.

3

The Yakovac Court stated that the warrants were relevant because "they were of consequence to
the search and subsequent discovery of the pipe underlying Yakovac's charge of possession."
161 Idaho at 446. The Court said, "the warrants were not relevant to the possession of
methamphetamine charge itself, but rather to explain the police officers' actions" and
"Yakovac' s arrest due to the outstanding warrants explains why the search incident to arrest
leading to the discovery of the methamphetamine was conducted." 145 Idaho at 446. This is a
res gestae basis for admission, especially where the Yakovac Court had already acknowledged
that the warrants "were not relevant to the possession of methamphetamine charge itself," which
was the material disputed fact at issue. Id.; see I.R.E. 401; see also State v. Yakovac, No. 31505,
2006 WL 3113540, at *8 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2006) (holding [t]he warrants were irrelevant
to the charge of possession of a controlled substance under LC. § 37-2732( c)(1 ). While the
warrants may have been relevant if probable cause for Yakovac's arrest was in issue, the
warrants were not relevant at trial because the justification for her arrest or the subsequent search
of her vehicle was not a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged."), ajf'd in part,
rev'd in part, 145 Idaho 437 (2008).
7

The State contends that evidence that Mr. Jones was on probation was not 404(b)
propensity evidence. 4 (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) Not only is this contention contrary to common
sense, this contention also conflicts with the district court's conclusions that "[p] eople on
probation are more likely to have committed something in the past," and "that mentioning
probation is evidence of the crimes, there has to have been another crime previously done," i.e.,
prior bad acts. (2/20/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-7; p.22, Ls.23-25.) Further, this argument is contrary to
established case law. The State claims Mr. Jones' probation was not a "prior bad act" within the
purview of I.R.E 404(b) because the jury was not informed of the reason(s) he was on
probation. 5 (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) However the State is arguing both sides of the cointhat the district court was correct in admitting the evidence under a 404(b) exception but also that
it was not prohibited 404(b) propensity evidence after all.

The fact that Mr. Jones is on

probation, which requires a criminal conviction, is clearly evidence demonstrating Mr. Jones's
propensity to commit crimes. The status of being on probation requires a criminal conviction, or
at least a criminal charge and a withheld judgment. Evidence "indicative of criminal activity" is
considered I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. See Alwin, 164 Idaho at 167. Because a person is not placed
on probation in the absence of criminal activity, evidence that a defendant is on probation is
I.RE. 404(b) evidence.

4

The State also presents a claim that the issue was not preserved, but then concedes in a footnote
that Mr. "Jones's 404(b) claim may nevertheless be preserved because it was actually decided by
the district court." (Respondent's Brief, p.13 n.3.) Mr. Jones agrees with the State's ultimate
concession. Mr. Jones sought to prohibit the admission of the testimony and evidence based on
several Idaho Rules of Evidence, including its tendency to show propensity to commit crimes or
other prior bad acts. (2/20/18 Tr., p.13, L.17 -p.14, L.2; p.19, Ls.3-9.)
5
Cf, State v. Alwin, 164 Idaho 160, 166-67 (2018) (holding "mugshots that have been trimmed
to eliminate reference to prior criminal behavior, and therefore do not constitute I.R.E. 404(b)
evidence, will be admitted so long as the mugshot is relevant and the mugshot' s probative value
outweighs prejudice to the defendant").

8

The State also claims that Mr. Jones' assertion that the district court erred because the
State never provided notice of its intent to introduce I.R.E. 404(b) propensity evidence is not
preserved.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26.)

Again, the State misunderstands its burden-

propensity evidence is not admissible unless the State seeks to admit it for some other purpose
and "files and serves reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence."

I.R.E. 404(b )(1-2). Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence showing propensity or
conformity with prior bad acts is prohibited, unless the State provides notice of its intent to
introduce such evidence for another purpose. I.R.E. 404(b)(2)(A-B). Under the Rule, the district
court is required to conduct an analysis, which includes a determination of whether the State
timely noticed its intent to use the evidence for some purpose other than propensity.
I.R.E. 404(b). If the State's notice was untimely, the court may, for good cause, excuse the lack
of pretrial notice. I.R.E. 404(b)(2)(B). Here, the State did not file and serve notice to Mr. Jones
prior to trial, nor did the district court make a finding of "good cause" such that the lack of
pretrial notice could be excused. (See 2/20/18 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.23, L.8.)
The jury did not need additional information regarding the circumstances or context of
the stop to determine whether Mr. Jones possessed a trafficking amount of heroin. However,
information that Mr. Jones was on probation for committing a prior crime was certainly not
harmless where the jury was being asked to determine whether Mr. Jones was trafficking in
heroin, not simply possessing it-a far less serious charge.

9

II.
The District Court Erred By Admitting The Knife That Mr. Jones Had In His Pocket As A Trial
Exhibit
The State claims that the knife was relevant to show Mr. Jones's lack of credibility and
that he lied to the police. (Respondent's Brief, pp.29-30.) In his closing arguments to the jury,
the prosecutor used the presence of the knife in Mr. Jones' pants pocket to challenge his
credibility, asking the jury: "Is that being straight when the Defendant has a knife concealed on
his person in addition to the heroin?" (2/21/18 Tr., p.365, Ls.16-18.) The admission of the knife
was erroneous and should have been excluded as irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative.
The State next argues that the admission of the knife as a trial exhibit was harmless.
(Respondent's Brief, p.31.)
Over defense counsel's objection, the district court admitted, as a trial exhibit, the knife
found in Mr. Jones' pocket. (2/21/18 Tr., p.209, Ls.6-16.) The district court found the knife was
relevant and admissible because, "knives are commonly used in drug transactions." (2/21/18
Tr., p.237, Ls.10-22.) Although the district court considered it under I.R.E. 403 and found there
was prejudice, it nevertheless permitted testimony and evidence relating to the knife because
"any unfair prejudice did not outweigh its probative value." (2/21/18 Tr., p.237, Ls.10-17.) The
admission of the knife into evidence was not harmless. While the knife was not relevant, it was
more prejudicial than probative of any material fact, and it was impermissibly being used to
inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury; it showed Mr. Jones as an untrustworthy person, a
dangerous man or a criminal, and therefore someone more likely to have a larger (trafficking)
amount of heroin.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand his case to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court
reduce his sentence or that it remand his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 6th day of August, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of August, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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